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/ • Kespondeiil , DobCMPf FPdPtril ' i r ivinqs K Loan Assuc i «it i uri 
("Desere t F e d e r a l " ) , by and thiouyl i l i s c o u n s e l of r e c o r d , David 
R. O l s e n , Esq , C\irl I Huefner , Es 1 C h a r l e s P, Sampson, 
E s q . o:f •= '" • ' '" "  k - m a t i 
lowing Brief of Respondent, 
^TATEM}..N1. „,:i .juSSUF\S PRESENTED FOR REVIEW • 
;<-~ « .o *• - r * -irt err i n determining that Th i rd 
Party plaint; if , j c ?-. > " {"Daniels") r did not have a valid 
mechai 1 ? I h i f? n f: i in I \ - \ 
t h e P r o j e c t J e^e i i be r 
\ri - r,r- i - ' . i . . i r t err i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t D e s e r e t 
Feder a - , t-*-- r t a s <= , defense tc: h i s f :>rec: :] DSI lr • s 
a c t i o n j&n^LS f d . r j r e t.. i K a N o t i c e of L i e n wi t h i n t h e s t a t u -
t o r y p e r i o d . 
DETERMINITIVE STATUTE •" 
U* ah Code Ann,, § 38-2 -7 (3 953) — See Addendum.. 
STATEMENT OF TEE CASE . . 
A. Nature of the Case 
This Is a third-party action i nsti tuted by Daniels to 
foreclose a mechanic's li en 01 1 the Park h*\ renue Condom: n :ii 1 ims 1 ("Pr o • 
ject '•) 3 ocated in P< =11: k City , Utah . In Aug ust of 19 80, Park A venue 
Development Company entered into a Bi 2 1 Id j ng Contract Agreement 
-
 J
 : 1 € J s pursuai 1 t: t :: • ; ?rl: 11 :i c: 1: 1 Dani e3 s 1; - as to ser v e as • the Gener al 
c ntractor for the construction of the Project. Darnels was to 
b* p.? id approximate] y $80,000.00 "profit" for the use i.ir; con- • 
tractor's license, and a salary for the actual services he preformed 
at the Project. Daniels was also a part owner of the Project and, 
presumably, anticipated a profit when the Project was sold. Daniels 
was paid approximately $15,000*00 for the actual work he performed 
on the Project. 
Construction of the Project was begun in or about August 
of 1980 and, by July 30, 1981, all construction called for by the 
Building Contract Agreement had been completed. Certificates of 
Final Inspection and Occupancy were issued by Park City in late 
July of 1981. 
On December 1, 1981, Daniels returned to the Project at 
the request of co-owner Vance McDonald because several water pipes 
had broken and the Project had suffered some water damage. Daniels 
made no repairs. He merely assessed the damage and made some phone 
calls to line up people who could make the repairs. On that same 
day, Daniels was informed by Vance McDonald that his services would 
not be required. Daniels undertook no further work. 
On February 3, 1982, Daniels filed a Notice of Lien with 
the Summit County Recorder against the Project, claiming a lien 
for the $80,000.00 "profit" called for in the Building Contract 
and listing the date of last work of December 1, 1981. 
On February 25, 1982, the Honorable David B. Dee of the 
Third District Court entered an Order Discharging Claims releasing 
from the Project all of the recorded claims of Daniels and, further, 
• : •• - 2 -
Ordering that Daniel s*" lien shal 1 have no effect as a 1 i en or i n-
terest upon the Project, upon the posting of a $75,000, 00 bond, 
was granted ex parte, Daniel s, by and through hi s counsel of record, 
stlpu lated that the Order discharge ng his li en coul d conti i n le in 
effect iiiit 11 March 5
 k 19 8 2 , whei i Daniels agreed to appear and show 
cause why the Order should not be made permanent. No heari i lg was 
held :: i :t March 5 1 982 an: id. c: i i Mar c h 1 5 1! 982 Dai ii el! s tl: ii: on igh 
h i s counsel, stipulated to continue the Order to Show Cam ise Hearing 
until April 5, 1982 , Again no hearing was held and on Apr i 1 ] 9 , 
21! , 1982, pi aintiff#s Motion, for Summary Judgment was heard by 
the Court. On .June 2 3 , 1982, the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwi n en • 
teireiJ <ni MUIHI deny my pi a inL 11 i: ' s Miition 1'ur Summary Judgment 
arid decreeing that Daniels" Jieni was not cancelled cur1" vacated. 
An Order to this effect was not signed by .imjcp Baldwin 'until Feb-
ruary 2/, I'JUJ, Daniels never objected to Judge Dee's Order Dis-
charging Claims nor did he attack the sufficiency of the sureties 
on the $7 5,0 JO no bnnb 
After, the Order Discharging Claims was recorded on Feb-
ruary 25, ^':JH<' Oeseret Federal made a loan to the owner of the 
•* - *
 !
 'it serurlncj repayment uT I. In:« I - «., HI., re-
corded -r ' ^i i
 r i ^h? * 
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On October 21, 1983, Daniels filed an Amended Answer, 
Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint seeking to foreclose his 
claimed mechanic's lien 
B. Course of Proceedings 
The Third Judicial Court in and for Summit County, State 
of Utah, the Honorable Philip R. Fishier presiding, granted Summary 
Judgment in favor of Deseret Federal and against Daniels on June 
18, 1984. 
C. Statement of Facts 
le In 1980, Daniels invested approximately $28,000.00 
in the development of an 8-unit condominium project in Park City, 
Utah ("Project")„ (Deposition of Jack C. Daniels p. 12). 
2. On August 14, 1980, Park Avenue Development Company 
entered into a Building Contract Agreement with Daniels whereby 
Daniels was to serve as the general contractor for the construction 
of the Project. (R. 163). 
3. In addition to being paid for his actual work on 
the Project, Daniels was to receive an additional $80,000.00 for 
"profit and overhead." (Deposition of Jack C. Daniels, pp. 22-
23, 55) 
4. In late August of 1980, construction of the Project 
commenced. (Deposition of Jack C. Daniels, p. 24). 
5. Although Daniels had been paid approximately 
$15,000.00 for his actual work on the Project, he had not been 
- 4 -
paid the $80,000,00 "overhead and profi t". (Deposition of Jack C. 
Daniels, p 55). 
•rLtiVlinn cal -id : by 
t;,~. Euildir-3 Contra : Agreement ».u J t .ompletecf r . ; - n i e > > -
tor the P r o j e c t . (Depose ' . ion ,.. f .•^c-. C D a r n e l s , -v.- 48-51) . 
Daniels testified; 
Ine building was absolutely compie: -*w A it=o ^  
was issued that occupancy report, and that 
was issued on the 3 0th of July, But 
from the 3 0th of July, that building, as far 
as J war concerned, I had completed in 
job. Iher-9 was no more work cone aftei 
that pei;;u of time that was in need of any-
thing. If it was, I didn't know- I had left 
the builiing and v-^ throu*^, *:th that -sot 
30 1981 , -c-nicls k.ie* ..*\ L ^ L ^ J ^ c L .e J tan Mecr ..';J^ . j . - : 
Act that r4- r c:o urt Nrvert,-: - ^ -^rnrd a Not; ^ e **4 ' ^-~ 
wi th t h p !"ii i in mil fount | PecordPi In pet let 1 .iin] \ a l i d a h In IIMII 
i n t e r e s t . (R. ' * I st) 
8, - l a t e O c t o b e r o r e a r l y November, one of t h e Pro-
j e c t ' . nwiKMs ' - (iR.'sled [ iJanit I s J nol (u Jjh» a mechanic ' \ l i e n 
w i t h i n t h e i n - p e r m i t t e d by law and s t a t e d t o D a n i e l s t h a t i t ho 
won 1 d r e f r a i n p r ^ irt f i ] i ng , h i s c I a i in \ i • > 111 d \ i e p a :i < :I ; ; i t h :i i t ; : • 
weeks " (1 !: 1=1 36) Daniel s was not paid the $80,000,00 "profit 
and overhead" within two weeks. (R. 149). . 
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9o On December 1, 1982, Daniels returned to the Project 
to inspect several water pipes which had broken• He undertook no 
repairs and was informed that his services would not be required. 
(Deposition of Jack C« Daniels, p. 50-51, 65-68). 
10. On February 3, 1982, nearly three months after the 
statutory filing deadline, Daniels filed a Notice of Lien with 
the Summit County Recorder against the Project claiming the 
$80,000.00 "profit and overhead." (R. 36). Daniels' Notice of 
Lien listed December 1, 1981 as the date that the last work was 
performed on the Project. 
11. On February 25, 1982, the Honorable David B. Dee 
of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, entered an Order Discharging Claims which ordered: 
that the recorded claims of [Daniels] as des-
cribed in plaintiff's Complaint are hereby 
released from [the Project], and shall have 4 
no effect as a lien or an interest whatsoever 
upon [project] . „ . upon the posting of a 
bond in the amount of $75,000.00 
(R. 13) . 
12. On February 25, 1982, an Undertaking and Bond was 
filed with the Summit County Clerk in the amount of $75,000.00 
and was recorded the same day. (R. 9). 
13. Daniels did not object to the sufficiency of the 
Undertaking and Bond at any time. (R. 1-291). 
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14. On or about March 1, 1982, Deseret Federal recorded 
its Deed of Trust securing repayment of a Note made by the owners 
of the Project. (R. 145). 
15. On March 5, 1982, Daniels stipulated that the Order 
Discharging Claims entered by Judge Dee and recorded on February 
25, 1982, could remain in effect until a hearing scheduled for 
March 5, 1982. (R. 15). 
16. No hearing was held on the Order Discharging Claims 
until June 21, 1982. (R. 113). 
17. On July 13, 1982, the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, 
Jr. entered an Order vacating and cancelling any lis pendens filed 
in connection with the Project, but not disturbing Judge Dee's 
Order Discharging Daniels' lien (R. 120). 
18. On February 18, 1983, Judge Baldwin entered an Amend-
ed Order ordering that Daniels' "lien not cancelled or vacated." 
(R. 138). 
19. On October 21, 1983 Daniels filed this action against 
Deseret Federal and others claiming an interest in the Project 
seeking to foreclose his claimed mechanic's lien which, according 
to Daniels, is prior to Deseret Federal's Deed of Trust. (R. 149) . 
20. On April 6, 1984, Judge Fishier granted Deseret 
Federal's Motion for Summary Judgment holding that Daniels' lien 
was not timely perfected and was, therefore, invalid. (R. 233). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Judge Fishier's entry of Summary Judgment in Deseret 
Federal's favor was proper because, as a matter of law, Daniels 
did not file his Notice of Lien within the 100 day statutory period* 
That period was not extended by Daniels' activity at the Project 
on December 1, 1981* Furthermore, Daniels' activity at the Project 
on December 1, 1981, did not constitute lienable work. As a third-
party lender, Deseret Federal is not estopped to assert that the 
untimely filing of Daniels Notice of Lien invalidates the lien. 
There are no allegations of any kind that Deseret Federal partici-
pated in the events leading to a claim of estoppel. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT, AS 
A MATTER OF LAW, WORK PERFORMED BY DANIELS ON 
DECEMBER 1, 1981 DID NOT EXTEND THE TIME AS 
TO WHICH A LIEN HAD TO BE FILED FOR WORK COM-
PLETED IN THE SUMMER OF 1981 NOR DID IT CON-
STITUTE AN INDEPENDENT BASIS FOR APPELLANT'S 
LIENo 
This case comes on appeal from the entry of summary judg-
ment against Daniels. As such, the standard of review is that 
enunciated by this Court in Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934 (Utah 
1979) as follows: 
Our inquiry on review is whether there 
is any genuine issue as to any material fact, 
and if there is not, whether the [movants] 
are entitled to judgment as a matter of lawe 
[Citations omitted,] The [party opposing the 
motion] cannot rely upon the mere allegations 
- 8 -
or denials of [its] pleadings to avoid a summary 
judgment but must set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial, 
Rule 56(e), U.R.C.P. 
604 P.2d at 936. The trial court correctly determined that no 
material facts were in dispute as to the invalidity of Daniels' 
lien. 
In this case, Daniels' unequivocal admissions formed 
the basis upon which the trial court determined, as a matter of 
law, that Daniels had no properly perfected mechanic's lien interest 
in the Project which is the subject of this action. 
Although Daniels treats the validity question as a single 
issue, there really are two separate, but related, issues. The 
first question is whether activities amounting to nothing more 
than inspection of the premises and other work preparatory to making 
certain repairs on a completed project are sufficient to extend 
the time in which a lien with respect to work performed on the 
original project may be filed under Section 38-1-7, Utah Code Ann. 
(1953, as amended). The second issue is whether that same prepa-
ratory activity provides an independent and sufficient basis for 
entitlement to a mechanic's lien under Section 38-1-3, Utah Code 
Ann. (1953, as amended), as to which Daniels' notice would con-
cededly have been timely filed.1 
1
 Inasmuch as Daniels' mechanic's lien is concededly based 
upon the value of services performed prior to December 
1, 1981, there would be a question of fact as to the 
reasonable value of the services rendered by Appellant 
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As to both issues, the trial court correctly determined 
as a matter of law that the activities were insufficient to vali-
date the claimed mechanic's lien, 
A. The work performed on December 1, 1981 was not substan-
tial in connection with the underlying contract under 
which the project was completed in the summer of 1981. 
The record shows without contravention that Daniels' 
construction contract was completed, and viewed as such by Daniels, 
in July of 1981, (Deposition of Jack C. Daniels, pp. 49-51.) 
The supporting evidence includes Daniels' own statements under 
oath (Deposition of Jack C. Daniels, pp. 48-49) . It is undisputed 
that, on December 1, 1981, Daniels came to the Project, assessed 
the damage done by broken pipes, and attempted to line up subcon-
tractors for the necessary repairs. (Deposition of Jack C. Daniels, 
pp. 50-51, 65-68.) 
In determining when additional work will extend the time 
for filing a notice of mechanic's lien, the Utah Supreme Court 
has consistently applied the rule first enunciated in Wilcox v. 
Cloward, 88 Utah 503, 56 P.2d 1, 6-8 (1936) as follows: 
on December 1, 1981 were this Court to determine that 
such services created an independent basis for the filing 
of a mechanic's lien. This court expressly recognized 
in Sierra Nevada Lumber Co. v. Whitmore, 24 Utah 130, 
66 P. 779 (1901) (dictum) that in the absence of a special 
contract fixing the value of the services, the lien is 
limited to the reasonable value of the services renderede 
There was no development of such a reasonable value in 
the proceedings below. 
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Trivial or minor adjustments made casually or 
long after the main work is completed cannot 
be used to tie on to the last labor done or 
materials furnished. Especially is this true 
if they are made for that purpose. But even 
small jobs where bona fide made to complete a 
contract which the claimant had the duty to 
complete, if not made too long after the main 
work is completed, especially if a part of a 
chain of similar or larger tasks performed in 
the process of finishing up or tapering off, 
will be sufficient to extend the time for filing 
the notice of lien. . . . 
. . . [T]he time for filing the lien may 
be extended if the matter of work and labor 
in . . . satisfactorily completing the job is 
not so trivial or minor that the failure to 
do it would still leave the contract substan-
tially performed so that the recovery might 
be had. 
See also Palombi v. D & C Builders, 22 Utah 2d 297, 452 P.2d 325, 
327 (1969); Naale v. Club Fontainbleu. 17 Utah 2d 125, 405 P.2d 
346 (1965) ; Totorica v. Thomas, 16 Utah 2d 175, 397 P.2d 984 (1965) ; 
cf. Carlisle v. Cox. 29 Utah 2d 136, 506 P.2d 60 (1973) (applying 
same doctrine in bonding statute context). 
The test applied by this Court in the cases cited above 
clearly includes two elements. First, the work must be substantial 
in relation to the performance contracted for and, second, the 
additional performance must occur relatively shortly after the 
original "completion." Deseret Federal submits that Daniels' work 
of December 1, 1981 fails to satisfy either of these elements and 
therefore the court below correctly determined as a matter of law 
that such work could not extend the time for filing of Daniels7 
- 11 -
notice of lien and therefore the filing on February 3, 1982 was 
not timely under § 38-1-7, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended) . 
Each of these elements is discussed separately hereafter. 
1. Substantial Relation to Contract. Daniels' argu-
ment seems to misapprehend the substantiality test applied in the 
line of cases beginning with Wilcox. He takes the position that 
the test of whether substantial work was done is a question of 
fact as to the amount of work performed (time and effort expended 
or materials used), apparently in contrast to the performance of 
no services whatsoever. This clearly misconstrues the holding of 
the Utah case law. 
The test enunciated by the Utah court in determining 
whether additional services or furnishing of additional materials 
extends the time for filing a notice of mechanic's lien is whether 
the amount of work is substantial in relation to the performance 
contemplated by the contract. The test itself was derived as a 
extension of the familiar doctrine of "substantial performance." 
In the seminal case, this Court has stated that the question of 
substantiality of an additional performance may be restated as 
whether the owner would have been able to successfully defend ag-
ainst the contractor's contract claim under the doctrine of sub-
stantial performance. See Wilcox v. Cloward, 88 Utah 515, 56 P.2d 
1, 7 (1936); cfa. Carlisle v. Cox. 29 Utah 2d 136, 506 P.2d 60, 62 
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(1973) (extending the same doctrine on the same principles, to 
contractor bond cases). 
Understanding the substantiality test in this light, it 
is clear that the work performed by Daniels on December 1, 1981, 
cannot, as a matter of law, be "substantial" as that term is used 
in this context. Daniels simply performed no additional work re-
quired under the original contract. On December 1, 1981, he did 
nothing to actually remedy the defects in the original performance 
of his contract. The work done under the original contract was 
as defective when Daniels left the property on December 1, 1981 
as it had been when he arrived. 
If he or his subcontractors had actually performed the 
repairs, there may well have been a question of fact as to whether 
that work was "substantial."2 It is significant that the Wilcox 
At least one jurisdiction has expressly held that repairs 
of defective performance cannot extend the time for filing 
the notice of lien. See H. E. Leonhardt Lumber Co. v. 
Ed Wamble Distributing Co., 378 P.2d 771 (Okla. 1963). 
A policy favoring such a rule is easily understood and 
articulated. Inasmuch as the mechanic's lien right is 
a creature of statute and in derogation of the common 
law, compliance with the formal requisites of perfecting 
such an interest are strictly construed. To permit a 
contractor or other mechanic's lien claimant to extend 
the time by repairing defects (particularly latent or 
otherwise unknown defects) of the claimant's own making 
allows a mechanic's lien claimant who has unsatisfactorily 
(and in some cases fraudulently) performed the contract 
to benefit from his own defective performance by enlarging 
the time for filing of the notice of lien. The Wilcox 
case is not necessarily repugnant to this position. In 
Wilcox there had been a continuing course of cleaning 
up of odds and ends on the project over a relatively 
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case specifically discusses a substantial repair necessitated by 
defective performance of an original roofing contract* The court 
stateds 
In the instant case the materials and labor 
to complete the roof as it should have been 
completed were necessary. It is not the case 
of replacing a few panes of glass broken in 
transit, but the case of work done to satisfac-
torily complete a contract. It can readily 
be seen that there is a marked distinction 
between permitting the time for filing a lien 
to date from the time a minor replacement of 
materials is made and the case where a contrac-
tor uses materials and labor in the matter of 
actually making satisfactory a job which other-
wise might have been considered as being in-
complete. In the one case the time for filing 
the lien may be extended if the matter of work 
and labor in so satisfactorily completing the 
job is not so trivial or minor that the failure 
to do it would still leave the contract sub-
stantially performed so that recovery might 
be had. 
88 Utah at 518, 56 P.2d at 8 (emphasis added). 
That simply is not the case here, however. By Daniels' 
own admission, the request to make the repairs was rescinded before 
he corrected or caused to be corrected any of the alleged deficiency 
in the performance of the original contract. (R. 50.) 
Daniels attempts to make much of the fact that he was 
"ordered" back to the job site by the owner of the property. Ad-
mittedly, several of the Utah cases cited on the issue of substan-
short period of time including the repair of an allegedly 
defective roof (although the evidence was conflicting 
as to how the need for repair arose) . Wilcox v. Cloward, 
supra, 56 P.2d at 6. 
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tiality deal with a situation in which a contractor undertook, at 
the contractor's own initiative, to perform additional services 
or provide additional materials. The cases correctly note that 
such voluntary actions could not extend the time for filing a mec-
hanic's lien. This concept, however, is not an element of the 
test of what is substantial work in connection with the contract. 
An entirely different issue would be before this Court 
if Daniels had actually performed the repairs requested. As the 
case stands, however, the trial court correctly determined that 
Daniels' work on December 1, 1985 was not, as a matter of law, 
substantial in relation to the Appellant's original contract. 
2. Timeliness. Daniels also fails the alternative test 
enunciated by this Court because the services rendered on December 
1, 1981 were not proximate in time to the performance of the origi-
nal contract. Daniels himself considered the Project to have been 
"absolutely completed" in the summer of 1981. Not a shred of evi-
dence in the record indicates that, at that time, the owner or 
Daniels believed that any additional work remained to be completed 
on the original contract. The pipes froze on December 1, 1981, 
more than four months after all parties believed the Project had 
been completed. The defective plumbing was at best a latent defect 
the discovery of which was serendipitous (though unfortunate) and 
could have occurred much later. 
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This is not a case such as Totorica v. Thomas, supra, 
where both owner and contractor understood that there were "some 
odds and ends" which needed to be completed after occupancy was 
possible but which were delayed because of weather and other fac-
tors. 16 Utah 2d at 176, 397 P. 2d at 985. The Wilcox case is 
the only other cited case in which the time for filing the mech-
anic's lien was deemed extended because of the substantiality of 
work. There, over a period of six weeks, the contractor had per-
formed a series of tasks to complete his contract which concluded 
with repair of a faulty roof. 88 Utah at 508 56 P.2d at 6. In 
Carlisle v. Cox, the delivery and installation of all but one heat 
register in connection with the performance of a furnace contract 
was deemed to be "last work" for purposes of establishing the time 
from which the action for recovery had to be filed. The court 
held that installation of the final register, less than two months 
later, could not further extend the time for filing. 506 P. 2d at 
62. 
This Court has consistently held that the issue of "sub-
stantiality" is generally a question of fact. As demonstrated by 
the Carlisle v. Cox decision, however, the court has also recog-
nized that in some instances this issue may be concluded as a matter 
of law. 29 Utah 2d at 139, 506 P.2d at 62. Deseret Federal submits 
that the trial court properly determined that the work performed 
by Daniels on December 1, 1981 was, as a matter of law, insubstan-
- 16 -
tial and not closely related in time to the original performance 
of the contract so as to extend the deadline for filing the lien. 
B. The work performed on December 1, 1985 was insufficient 
to establish an independent basis that entitled Daniels 
to file a notice of mechanics lien for the work so per-
formed. 
The trial court correctly determined that the work per-
formed by Daniels, consisting of inspection of damages, assess-
ment of work necessary for repair, and contacting subcontractors 
to undertake the repair work, did not entitle him to a mechanic's 
lien, under Utah Code Ann. Section 38-1-3 (1953, as amended). 
Daniels would have this Court adopt a construction of the 
Utah mechanic's lien statute, and Section 38-1-3, Utah Code Ann., 
in particular, that completely ignores the express language of 
the statute and the developed case law which establishes the type 
of work which entitles a contractor to claim a mechanic's lien. 
Section 38-1-3, Utah Code Ann., requires that the con-
tractor's services must be "used in the construction, alteration, 
or improvement" of a building, structure, or improvement of prem-
ises. The trial court correctly found that there was no material 
issue of fact that precluded its determination that Daniels had 
performed no services which would entitle him to a mechanic's lien. 
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Daniels, it is 
clear that his labor on December 1., 1981 was merely preliminary 
efforts toward effectuating repairs or maintenance of the plumbing 
system. In Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 924, this 
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Court expressly noted that "[o]rdinary maintenance or cleanup work" 
did not constitute an "improvement" for purposes of establishing 
mechanics' liens with respect to a project* 
This Court has consistently ruled that there must be 
some contribution to an improvement on the land as a basis for a 
mechanic's lien* See Calder Bros, Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 
924 & n. 1 (Utah 1982) ; First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. C.N. 
Zundel & Assocs., 600 P.2d 521, 524-25 (Utah 1979). As stated in 
the Zundel cases 
The purpose of [mechanic's] lien statutes 
is to protect those who have added directly 
to the value of property by performing labor 
or furnishing materials upon ite 
600 P.2d at 524-25 (quoting Stanton Transportation Co. v. Davis, 
9 Utah 2d 184, 187, 341 P.2d 207, 209 (1959)). (Emphasis added). 
See also Note, 1966 Utah L. Rev. 181, 183-84. 
In the instant case, Daniels simply added no value what-
soever to the property by virtue of improvement, alteration, con-
struction, or repair by virtue of any labor undertaken on Decem-
ber 1, 1981. 
Daniels would rely on the decision of this Court in Zions 
First National Bank v. Carlson, 23 Utah 2d 395, 464 P.2d 387 (1970) . 
There this Court recognized that an architect has a right to a 
mechanic's lien under Section 38-1-3, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as 
amended) for services rendered in preparing plans, even though 
those plans "may not be brought to fruition by erection of the 
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building." This holding is simply inapposite to the case presently 
before this Court. 
The statutory language granting architects and engineers 
a right to a mechanic's lien does not include the limiting language 
"in the construction, alteration, or improvement of any building" 
that applies to a contractor's mechanic's lien. The trial court 
correctly determined that, under the clear language of Utah's mec-
hanic's lien statute, Daniels' work on December 1, 1981 could not 
raise an entitlement to a mechanic's lien.3 
The trial court further correctly pointed out that Daniels 
was not asked to prepare an "estimate of costs" but to repair or 
otherwise correct a defective original performance. 
Daniels asserts, without the citation of any authority 
or even a clear rationale, that a distinction among different types 
of lien claimants is somehow unconstitutional. The right to a 
The trial court distinguished among three categories of 
lien claimants (contractors, mining contractors, and 
architects and similarly situated professionals) and 
noted that the performance required for a claim of me-
chanic's lien under Section 38-1-3, Utah Code Ann. (1953, 
as amended) is different for each of these groups. The 
Utah mechanic's lien statute does not, however, create 
separate classifications of mechanics' liens. Section 
38-1-10, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended) specifically 
provides that all mechanics' liens are on "equal footing." 
Furthermore, Section 38-1-5, relating to priority of 
mechanics' liens, specifically provides that all liens 
relate to the commencement of visible work on the ground. 
In Zions First National v. Carlson, 23 Utah 2d 395, 464 
P.2d 387, 389 (1970), the court specifically noted that 
the priority issue that would arise under Section 38-1-
5 was not before the court. 
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mechanic's lien is clearly a creation of statute. In delimiting 
non-suspect classifications in a statutory framework that does 
not impinge upon fundamental rights, the constitutional test is 
that the legislature must have a rational basis, consistent with 
the objectives of the statute, for the distinctions made. See 
Thompson v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 724 P.2d 958, 959 (Utah 1986); 
Liedtke v. Schettler, 649 P*2d 80 (Utah 1982) • The rational basis 
for the classification system of the Utah mechanic's lien statute 
is readily apparent when considering the policies behind the stat-
ute. 
The purposes of a mechanic's lien statute are two-fold: 
first, to protect the interest of mechanics and materialmen; and 
second, to provide a system of notices under which individuals 
involved in various aspects of the business of construction and 
mining, including financial institutions engaged in the business 
of loaning money to permit such development, may have certainty 
as to conflicting claims to property. In connection with the second 
of these purposes, the legislature and the courts of this State 
have consistently applied a policy requiring notice, by virtue of 
the visibility of improvements, as the basis for granting priority 
to a mechanic's lien over subsequent interests. See First of Denver 
Mortgage Investors v. C.N. Zundel & Assocs., 600 P.2d 521, 525-26 
(Utah 1979) ; Western Mortgage Loan Corp. v. Cottonwood Construction 
Co. , 18 Utah 2d 409, 424 P.2d 437 (1967). This policy is inherent 
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in the limiting language that applies to contractors, subcontrac-
tors, and other persons requiring that the services be performed 
in connection with the "construction, alteration, or improvement" 
of property. 
The legislature recognized, however, that the services 
performed by architects and engineers, although conferring a sub-
stantial benefit on the owner of property, will never constitute 
visible improvements unless brought to fruition by other contrac-
tors. On this basis, the legislature made a rational distinction 
between the architects and engineers on the one hand, and other 
contractors on the other. Indeed, prior to 1933 the liens for 
mechanics and architects were granted in separate sections. See 
Zions First National Bank v. Carlson, supra, 464 P.2d at 388-89. 
Although the mechanic's lien statute is to be construed 
liberally in favor of protecting mechanic's lien interests, such 
construction does not permit, let alone require, that the express 
statutory language be ignored. This Court has recognized that 
"wherever possible effect should be given to every part of an Act." 
Totorica v. Thomas, supra, 397 P.2d at 987. 
The basis for Daniels7 reliance on the case of Calder 
Bros. Co. v. Anderson. 652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982), and particularly 
the reliance on the emphasized language of the material from that 
case quoted in Daniels' Brief, is far from clear. The Calder Bros. 
case, unlike the case presently before the Court, did not deal 
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with the validity of liens under Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3, but rather 
with the priority of mechanic's liens under the "relation back" 
principle embodied in Section 38-1-5, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as 
amended). If anything, the Calder Bros, case illustrates that 
different types of work, notably repairs, may be treated less favor-
ably than other work of construction for purposes of the mechanic's 
lien law. Recognizing the notice policy behind the mechanics 
lien statute, the Calder Bros, court recognized that "[o]rdinary 
maintenance or clean-up work" is in a different category from other 
services done in connection with the construction, alteration, or 
improvement. 652 P.2d at 924. The "tacking" discussed in Calder 
Bros. deals only with assessing what types of services are performed 
in connection with a single project for purposes of placing all 
mechanics and materialmen for that project on equal footing under 
the mechanic's lien priority scheme. Such principles relate to 
the issue of commencement of work for establishing priority, not 
to the determination of when the last work was performed for deter-
mining when a notice of lien may be validly filed. The Calder 
Bros, decision fails to support Daniels' position. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY HELD, AS A MATTER 
OF LAW, THAT DESERET FEDERAL IS NOT ESTOPPED 
TO ASSERT THE UNTIMELY FILING OF DANIELS' 
NOTICE OF LIEN TO INVALIDATE THE CLAIMED LIEN 
Anticipating a holding that his activity at the Project 
on December 1, 1981, was insufficient to extend the statutory period 
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within which he was required to file his Notice of Lien, Daniels 
argues that the owner of the Project is estopped to assert the 
late filing to invalidate the lien and, in addition, that Deseret 
Federal is also estopped. 
The Utah Mechanic's Lien Act, Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7 
(1953) , required Daniels to file a Notice of his claimed lien within 
100 days from when he completed his contract, or November 8, 1981. 
Daniels did not file a Notice of Lien until February 2, 1982, nearly 
three months late. (R. 36). 
According to Daniels, he didn't timely file because in 
late October or early November of 1980, one of the Projects7 owners 
requested Daniels "not to file a mechanic's lien within the time 
permitted by law and stated to him that if he would refrain from 
filing, his claim would be paid in two weeks." (R. 84.) Based 
upon the owner's request and Daniels' reliance upon that request, 
Daniels argues that the owner is estopped to assert the late filing 
to invalidate his claimed lien. Furthermore, Daniels argues that 
because he recorded his Notice of Lien, albeit three months late, 
before Deseret Federal recorded its Deed of Trust, Deseret Federal 
is also estopped since the Utah Recording Act imparts constructive 
notice to the world of claimed interests in property from and after 
the date the instrument evidencing that interest is recorded. Utah 
Code Ann. § 57-3-2 (1953). Thus, Daniels argues, subsequent pur-
chasers or mortgagees take subject to the prior recorded interest. 
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Ochoa v. Hernandez v Morales, 230 UeSe 139 (1913). As will be 
shown below, the Recording Act has no application to the Utah Me-
chanic's Lien Act* 
Despite the notice provision of the Recording Act, the 
Utah Mechanic's Lien Act imparts constructive notice to the world 
of claimed mechanic's lien interests from and after the time visible 
improvements have been made on the ground and the priority of the 
mechanic's lien relates back to that time if the lien is properly 
perfected. Utah Code Ann* § 38-1-3 (1953); Western Mortgage Loan 
Corp. v. Cottonwood Co.. 18 Utah 2d 409, 424 P.2d 437 (1967). 
Thus, in priority disputes involving mechanic's lien claimants, 
subsequent purchasers or mortgagees, such as Deseret Federal, who 
record their interest take subject to as yet unperfected mechanic's 
liens, assuming those liens are subsequently perfected. Obviously, 
in March of 1982, visible improvements had been made at the Proj-
ect, since construction was complete by July 30, 1981. (Deposition 
of Jack C. Daniels, pp. 48-49.) It follows that all persons dealing 
with the Project after July 30, 1981, including mortgagees such 
as Deseret Federal, had constructive notice that as yet unperfected 
mechanic's liens might attach to the Project. The fact that Daniels 
recorded a Notice of Lien before Deseret Federal recorded its Deed 
of Trust did nothing to enhance the constructive notice already 
imparted to Deseret Federal; nor did it establish priority since 
the priority of Daniels' claimed lien related back to August of 
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1980 when visible improvements were made on the ground; consequent-
ly, Daniels' position as against Deseret Federal was not improved 
merely because he recorded first.4 
Since the fact that Daniels recorded first does nothing 
to further the analysis of the validity of his lien, the real issue 
is: Even assuming that the owner is estopped to assert the untimely 
filing of Daniels' Notice of Lien5, is Deseret Federal? Judge Fish-
ier held that Deseret Federal was not estopped and, as will be 
demonstrated below, this Court should affirm that holding. 
This Court has recognized that the Mechanic's Liens Act 
must be construed on the theory that some of the provisions are 
intended to protect the mechanic and others are intended to protect 
the owner, while still others are intended to protect subsequent 
purchasers or mortgagee. Eccles Lumber Co. v. Martin, 31 Utah 
241, 87 P.2d 714 (1906). Deseret Federal submits that the require-
The Notice is devoid of assertions giving notice 
of a claim of estoppel. Rather, it references 
only a date of last work of December 1, 1981. 
If work was performed on this date, Daniels 
would have priority as to such work. However, 
the Notice of Lien clearly provides no notice 
of any other claim which would extend a filing 
date for the bulk of the amount claimed. 
For purposes of this appeal only, Deseret Fed-
eral is will to concede that an owner may, in 
appropriate circumstances, be estopped to assert 
the untimeliness of the filing of a Notice of 
Lien. It is not clear, however, that his Court 
has ever so held. Indeed, the policy consid-
erations that form the basis for the statutory 
scheme, militate against such a position. 
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ment that a Notice of Lien be timely filed is designed to protect 
subsequent purchasers and mortgagees. See General Electric Supply 
Co, etc., v. Bennett, 626 P.2d 844 Monto 844, 847 (1981) (the pur-
pose of requiring the recording of a notice of lien is to protect 
all parties dealing with the property, including innocent third 
parties and subsequent purchasers.) 
By necessity, as a trade-off for giving mechanics priority 
as of the time visible improvements were commenced on the ground, 
the legislature required mechanics to file a Notice of Lien within 
one hundred days after completing their contract. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 38-1-7 (1953). Failure to record within that time invalidates 
the claimed lien. Naale v. Club Fountainbleu, 17 Utah 2d 125, 
405 Po2d 346 (1965). The obvious legislative purpose for requiring 
contractors, such as Daniels, to record a Notice of Lien within 
one hundred days is to allow subsequent purchasers or mortgagees, 
such as Deseret Federal, to adequately assess the risk that mech-
anics liens may attach to the property and relate back to when 
visible improvements were made* If any improvements exist on the 
ground, constructive notice is imparted to the world that mechanic's 
liens may be extant.6 If those liens are later perfected within 
6
 The provisions of Section 38-1-7 establishing 
the time within which notices must be filed 
clearly limit the exposure of third-parties 
dealing with property upon which improvements 
have been made* Such a third-party takes sub-
ject only to liens for work completed during 
the 100 day period preceding the date of the 
- 26 -
the statutory time limits, subsequent purchasers or mortgagees will 
take subject to them. To assist buyers and lenders in assessing 
the risk of such liens, the legislature imposed the 100 day limit 
during which the contractor was required to perfect the lien. In 
other words, when dealing with improved property, there are no 
guarantees that there are no outstanding, yet unperfected, mechan-
ic's liens which, according to the Mechanics7 Lien Act, would relate 
back and take priority to the interest of a subsequent purchaser 
or mortgagee. However, the requirement that a Notice of Lien be 
recorded within one hundred days affords the subsequent purchaser 
or mortgagee the opportunity to assess that risk. 
If mechanics were not required to perfect their interest 
by recording a Notice of Lien within a relatively short time period, 
the alienability of land would be substantially impaired. In fact, 
if there were no limiting period, improved land would be essentially 
inalienable. Thus, the requirement that a Notice of Lien be re-
third-party's interest. To hold otherwise 
renders entirely meaningless the notice filing 
requirements. Thus, Deseret Federal could 
take subject only to liens for lienable work 
completed after November 17, 1981 (100 days 
prior to February 25, 1982). As demonstrated 
elsewhere in the Brief, no lienable work was 
performed after November 17, 1981. Assuming 
that it can be objectively determined that 
all work on a project was completed prior to 
the beginning of the 100 day period, third 
parties should, as a matter of policy, take 
property free and clear of any mechanic lien 
claims regardless of their filing date. This 
case is such a case. 
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corded within 100 days after completion of the contract is obviously 
designed to afford subsequent purchasers or mortgagees the ability 
to assess the risk of outstanding unperfected mechanics' liens, 
which, in turn, promotes the free alienability of lando Since 
the requirement that a Notice of Lien be filed within one hundred 
days after completion of the contract is designed to protect third 
parties dealing with property, Daniels' argument that third parties 
may be estopped, based upon the owner's conduct, from asserting 
the late filing to invalidate the lien is without merit* 
The privilege of asserting a mechanic's lien is conferred 
by statute, and although the statute should be liberally construed 
to effect its objective of protecting mechanics, compliance with 
the requirements of the statute is required before a party is en-
titled to its benefits• AAA Fencing Company v. Raintree Develop-
ment and Energy Company, 714 P.2d 289 (Utah 1986). 
This requirement of strict compliance is very compelling 
in the context of the timely filing of a Notice of Lien* As demon-
strated above, the requirement that a Notice of Lien be recorded 
within 100 days primarily benefits subsequent purchasers or mort-
gagees. As pointed out by the authoritative treatise on statutory 
construction: "laws enacted for the protection of third persons 
should not be permitted to be waived since third persons interested 
in the statutes are not made party to the waiver*ff N* Singer 2A 
Sutherland Statutory Instruction, § 5508 (Sands 4th ed. 1984) This 
- 28 -
policy should also be applied to Daniels7 estoppel agreement. To 
estop a subsequent purchaser or mortgagee from asserting the un-
timely filing of a Notice of Lien because the owner promised to 
make payment would, as pointed out by Judge Fishier in his Memo-
randum Decision, "allow owners and individual mechanic's lien claim-
ants to determine the priority of other lien claimants whether 
they were other mechanics lien claimants or holders of trust deeds 
and mortgages. This would create confusion in the law, which would 
be intolerable." (R. 238-9.) 
For example, all subsequent purchasers or mortgagees of 
improved property take with constructive notice of as yet unper-
fected mechanic's liens. Consequently, if the owner was estopped 
to assert the late filing of a Notice of Lien or could waive the 
recording of a Notice of Lien, those subsequent purchasers and 
mortgagees, having constructive notice of the lien, would take 
subject to the lien. As a result subsequent purchasers and mort-
gagees would always be subject to side deals between owners and 
mechanics. There would be no effective way to discover these side 
deals. Mechanics, by not recording their Notice of Lien, could 
induce subsequent purchasers to purchase the property or mortgagees 
to lend money against the property. They would then take advan-
tage of the statute's protection and claim priority over those sub-
sequent purchasers or mortgagees. This court should not sanction 
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less than arms-length deals between owners and mechanics to dupe 
third parties. 
Deseret Federal does not contend that owners, subsequent 
purchasers or mortgagees should never be estopped to assert the 
late recording of a Notice of Lien to invalidate the claimed lien. 
Rather, Deseret Federal urges this court to adopt the principle 
that strict compliance with the mechanic's lien requirements for 
perfection of the lien is required; however, the equitable doctrine 
of estoppel may be applied as against the party creating the estop-
pel . In this case, although the owner of the Project might be 
estopped to assert the untimely filing to invalidate the lien, 
Deseret Federal should not. As this Court stated in Utah Savings 
and Loan Association v. Mecham. 12 Utah 2d 335, 366 P.2d 598 (1961) : 
There is no doubt but that a mortgagee may be 
estopped from claiming a priority over a me-
chanic's lienc However, in order to establish 
an estoppel against the mortgagee, the lien 
claimant must show some concealment, misrepre-
sentation, act, or declaration by the mortgagee 
upon which the lienholder properly relied and 
by which he was induced to act differently 
than he would have otherwise have acted. 
12 Utah 2d at 441, 366 P.2d at 602. 
Similarly, in In re Williamson, 43 B.R. 813 (Bankr. Utah 
1984) , Judge Clark applied the principle enunciated in Utah Savings 
and Loan v. Mecham. In that case, the owner completed the Notice 
of Lien forms for the mechanic's lien claimants. The Notices of 
Lien did not comply with the requirements of the Utah Mechanic's 
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Lien Act. These defects included the omission of the expiration 
date of the notary's commission and the lack of oaths and/or ac-
knowledgments. Judge Clark held that the mechanics' failure to 
comply with the statutory requirements invalidated the liens. 
The mechanics argued that because the owner completed, acknowledged 
and notarized the Notice of Lien forms, the owner and subsequent 
mortgagees should be estopped from asserting their invalidity. 
Judge Clark disagreed with this argument holding: 
This estoppel argument would be a persuasive 
defense against an attack made on these notices 
by the [owner] who could not be allowed to 
enjoy the fruits of his errors at the expense 
of those injured thereby. However, in this 
case, the lien notices are being attacked by 
a third creditor, who, according to the record 
before the court, had nothing to do with creat-
ing the defective notices. As to him the lien-
holders' estoppel argument . . . must fail. 
43 B.R. at 824. 
In support of his argument that Deseret Federal is es-
topped from asserting the untimely filing of his Notice of Lien 
to invalidate the lien, Daniels refers this court to Rice v. Granite 
School District, 23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159 (1969). In that case, 
the defendant school district was estopped to assert plaintiff's 
failure to file a Notice of Claim within ninety days as required 
by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. The failure to file was, 
according to this Court, induced by the defendant's insurance a-
gent's promises to get the matter settled. This court reversed 
the trial court's dismissal of the action because of the untimely 
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filing, on the grounds that where the delay in commencing the action 
was induced by the conduct of the defendant or its insurance ad-
justor acting in its behalf, the defendant cannot raise non-com-
pliance with the notice requirement as a defense. Deseret Federal 
accepts this Court's decision in Rice as the law, but submits that 
Rice is consistent with the Utah Savings and In re Williamson de-
cisions requiring active conduct on the part of the mortgagee before 
the mortgager can be estopped. In this case, since Deseret Federal 
did nothing to give rise to an estoppel, it simply cannot be es-
topped. 
Daniels relies heavily in his Brief upon the case of 
Beltline Brick Co. v. Standard Home Building, 213 N.W. 41 (1927). 
Deseret Federal submits that although the Beltline Brick decision 
appears to support Daniels' argument, it is contrary to the poli-
cies underlying the requirements of the Utah Mechanic's Lien Act 
which are designed to protect both mechanics and third parties 
dealing with the property. If the Beltline Brick rationale were 
adopted by this Court, the one hundred day filing requirement and 
the protection afforded by its enforcement would be eviscerated. 
Mechanics could file late and claim an estoppel to contest 
the late filing, or that the owner waived the filing time period. 
Those mechanics would thereby obtain leverage against the owner 
by clouding the title to the property thereby impairing its alien-
ability. Furthermore, mechanics could simply not file until the 
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property were sold or mortgaged and then claim priority over the 
subsequent purchaser or mortgagee. 
Daniels played this game. In his Brief, Daniels unabash-
edly admits that the "owner, who was trying to obtain refinancing 
before the expiration of the one hundred day period requested Dan-
iels not to lien the property and if he refrained from doing so, 
he would be paid in two weeks." (Appellant's Brief, p. 4.) Daniels 
wasn't paid in two weeks, yet he waited another three months to 
file. His Notice of Lien stated the last work performed was Decem-
ber 1 — but gave not notice whatsoever of the existence of his 
claim of estoppel. In addition, Daniels did not object to Judge 
Dee's Order Discharging Claims. In fact, he stipulated that the 
Order could continue in effect for another four months until he 
finally realized that the owner wasn't going to pay him. In es-
sence, Daniels did everything necessary to induce Deseret Federal 
into lending money to the owner. Thus, his claim that Deseret 
Federal should be estopped is somewhat disingenuous. 
In summary, if mechanics do not comply with the statutory 
requirements for perfecting their lien interest, those mechanics 
should bear the risk of non-payment. After all, it is the mechanic 
who has dealt with the owner, has not been paid and is in the best 




Based upon the arguments set forth above, and the cases 
cited thereinf this Court should affirm the trial court's ruling 
that Daniels' claimed mechanic's lien is invalid. 
m >£k2Zz. DAVID R. OLSEN, ESQ. 
CARL F. HUEFNER, ESQ. 
CHARLES P. SAMPSON,ESQ. 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorneys for Respondent Deseret 




38-1-7. Notice of claim — Contents — Recording — Ser-
vice on owner of property* 
(1) Every original contractor within 100 days after the completion of his 
contract, and except as provided in this section, every person other than the 
original contractor who claims the benefit of this chapter within 80 days 
after furnishing the last material or performing the last labor for or on any 
land, building, improvement, or structure, or for any alteration, addition to, 
repair of, performance of any labor in, or furnishing any materials for, any 
mine or mining claim, shall file for record with the county recorder of the 
county in which the property, or some part of the property, is situated, a 
written notice to hold and claim a lien. 
(2) This notice shall contain a statement setting forth the following in-
formation: 
(a) the name of the reputed owner if known or, if not known, the 
name of the record owner; 
(b) the name of the person by whom he was employed or to whom he 
furnished the material; 
(c) the time when the first and last labor was performed, or the first 
and last material was furnished; 
(d) a description of the property, sufficient for identification; and 
(e) the signature of the lien claimant or his authorized agent, and 
the date signed 
(3) Within 30 days after filing the notice of lien, the lien claimant shall 
deliver or mail by certified mail to either the reputed owner or record 
owner of the real property a copy of the notice of lien. If the record owner's 
current address is not readily available, the copy of the claim may be 
mailed to the last known address of the record owner, using the names and 
addresses appearing on the last completed real property assessment rolls of 
the county where the affected property is located. Failure to deliver or mail 
the notice of lien to the reputed owner or record owner precludes the lien 
claimant from an award of costs and attorneys' fees against the reputed 
owner or record owner in an action to enforce the lien. 
(4) When a subcontractor or any person furnishes labor or material as 
stated in Subsections (1) through (3) at the request of an original contrac-
tor, then the final date for the filing of a notice of intention to hold and 
claim a lien for a subcontractor or a person furnishing labor or material at 
the request of an original contractor is 80 days after completion of the 
original contract of the original contractor. 
• • 
A. DEAN JEFFS 
JEFFS & JEFFS 
Post Office Box 783 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: (801) 373-8848 
-and-
GEORGE A. HUNT 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Post Office Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Attorneys for Third Party 
Defendant Deseret Federal 
Savings and Loan Association 
A
-
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JACK C. DANIELS, et al., 
Defendants, 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
JACK C. DANIELS, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
-v-
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS 
& LOAN ASSOCIATION, et al., 
Third-Party Defendants. 
Civil No. 6790 
The motion of Third-Party Defendant Deseret Federal 
Savings & Loan Association came on regularly for hearing 
before this Court on March S, 1984, the Honorable Philip R. 
Fishier, District Judge, presiding, George A. Hunt of Snow, 
Christensen & Martineau and A. Dean Jeffs of Jeffs & Jeffs 
appearing for Third-Party Defendant Deseret Federal Savings S 
Loan Association and Gordon A. Madsen of Madsen & Cummings 
c 
appearing for Third-Party Plaintiff Jack Daniels, and the 
Court having heard argument of counsel and having reviewed 
the memoranda on file with the Court and having requested 
supplemental memoranda from counsel and the same having been 
filed, and the deposition of Defendant and Third-Party Plain-
tiff Jack C. Daniels having been published and the Court being 
fully advised in the premises and having rendered its Memorandum 
Decision in the matter on April 6, 1984, granting the motion 
of Third-Party Defendant Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Associa-
tion, now, therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Motion 
to Dismiss of Third-Party Defendant Deseret Federal Savings & 
Loan Association be and the same hereby is granted and judgment 
is rendered in its favor and against Third-Party Plaintiff Jack" 
C« Daniels, no cause of action• 
DATED this jfm — day of April, 1984 • 
BY THE COURT: 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CEN CORPORATION, . j 
Plaintiff, ] 
VS. ] 
JACK C. DANIELS, DEBRA ESTES, ] 
SCOTT BERRY, DEBRA ANN SITZ- ] 
BERGER, and AMY STANTON EAGLESON, 
Defendants. ] 
JACK C. DANIELS, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
and Appellant 
vs. 
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS & 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, A-ONE CONSTRUC-
TION, INC., MILLER BRICK SALES, 
EUGENE E. DOMS and MICHAEL R. 
McCOY, 
Third Party Defendants 
and Deseret Federal Savings 
& Loan Association being 
also respondent. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Case No. 86-0466 
i Category No. 13.b. 
GORDON A. MADSEN, ESQ. 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS, ESQ. 
Attorneys for Appellant, 
Jack C. Daniels 
225 South 200 East, #150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CARL F. HUEFNER, ESQ. 
CHARLES P. SAMPSON, ESQ. 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & 
HANSON 
Attorneys for Respondent, 
Deseret Federal Savings & 
Loan 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing Brief of Respondent was mailed, postage pre-
paid this ^?'^ d a v o f March, 1986, to: 
Gordon A. Madsen, Esq. 
Robert C. Cummings, Esq. 
225 South 200 East, #150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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